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Unemployment and Finance: 
How Do Financial and Labour Market Factors Interact? 
 
Using data for 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004, we investigate how labour and 
financial factors interact to determine unemployment. We show that the impact of financial 
variables depends strongly on the labour market context. Increased market capitalization as 
well as decreased banking concentration reduce unemployment if the level of labour market 
regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining is low. The above financial 
variables have no effect otherwise. Increasing intermediated credit worsens unemployment 
when the labour market is weakly regulated and coordinated, whereas it reduces 
unemployment otherwise. These results suggest that the respective virtues of bank-based 
and market-based finance are crucially tied to the strength of labour regulation. 
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 1 Introduction
For a long time, the diversity of unemployment rates among countries has fuelled the debate
concerning the role of labour market institutions. A rich literature has developed, depicting
strong labour legislation, unemployment protection, wage taxation and union action as sources
of rigidity. In general, they are thought to lead to a low equilibrium rate of employment (Nickell
(1997), Siebert (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1999))1.
This literature has recently been reinforced by studies on the interactions between institu-
tional arrangements within labour markets. For instance, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel & Quintini
(2002) show, for instance, that the harmful e®ect of the gross replacement rate on unemployment
is ampli¯ed when the duration of unemployment bene¯t is long. Similarly, Nickell, Nunziata &
Ochel (2005) argue that the tax wedge increases unemployment all the more when the degree of
coordination in wage bargaining is high. In a similar vein, the literature on institutional comple-
mentarities and substitutability has devoted special attention to the interactions between labour
market institutions (notably employment protection legislation or union density) and product
market regulations2.
Labour and product market institutions are not the only factors determining unemployment.
The empirical literature on 'growth and ¯nance' shows that investment and growth are strongly
related to ¯nancial development3. It is also well known that the size of ¯nancial markets, the role
of ¯nancial intermediation, the degree of banking concentration etc. di®er dramatically among
countries (Allen & Gale (1995, 2000)). This has given rise to an abundant literature on the
opposition between bank-based and marked-based ¯nancial systems. This literature investigates
the respective virtues of banks and ¯nancial markets in terms of a reduction of information
asymmetry reduction and corporate ¯nancing. While banks allow to ¯nance small and risky
businesses as well as ¯rms with lesser reputation and intangible assets, arm's length ¯nancing
(through ¯nancial markets or multiple banking relationships) is more suitable for large and
creditworthy ¯rms, with solid reputation and tangible assets (Berlin & Loeys (1988), Diamond
(1991), Berlin & Mester (1992) and Rajan (1992)).
These issues are all the more interesting considering recent developments within the politi-
cal economy literature, which stress the interdependence between labour and ¯nancial market
devices. According to Pagano & Volpin (2005), ¯nance and labour contribute jointly to design
the opposition between the so-called corporatist and non-corporatist economies. Contrary to the
latter, corporatist economies are characterized by a proportional (rather than majority) voting
system, weak shareholder protection as well as strong employment protection. In a similar vein,
some contributions suggest that the emergence of bank-based ¯nance and tight labour regulation
1For a survey of the literature on the links between labour market institutions and employment performances,
see Arpai & Mourre (2005).
2The theoretical aspects of this literature are explored by Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), Hebell & Haefke
(2003), Amable & Gatti (2004) and Amable & Gatti (2006). Empirical analysis has been advanced by Nicoletti
& Scarpetta (2005), Gri±th, Harrison & Macartney (2006), Berger & Danninger (2007), Amable, Demmou &
Gatti (2007), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007) and Kugler & Pica (2008).
3See, among others, Levine & Zervos (1998), Beck & Levine (2002), Beck, Levine & Loayza (2002), Carlin &
Mayer (2003) and Djankov (2008).
2are both associated with civil law rather than with common-law (Egrungor (2004), Botero et al.
(2005)) as well as with concentrated ¯nancial wealth (Perroti & Von Thadden (2006)). Taken
together, these arguments suggest that a correlation might exist between tight institutions on
labour and ¯nancial markets.
The theoretical literature has recently emphasized the idea that the interactions between
labour and ¯nancial market institutions may have important consequences for aggregate employ-
ment. In fact, ¯nancial market imperfections create a bias in decisions concerning the creation
of ¯rms, job vacancies etc. According to the literature, the sign and extent of the bias would
depend on the structure of the labour market (Rendon (2000), Belke & Fehn (2002), Koskela
& Stenbacka (2002) and Wasmer & Weil (2004)). Nevertheless empirical studies addressing the
issue are infrequent. A few empirical papers focus on the determinants of labour demand and
provide evidence on the role of ¯nancial factors based on micro-data (Nickell & Wadhwani (1991),
Sharpe (1994), Nickell & Nicolitsas (1999), Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke, Fehn & Foster (2004),
Caggese (2006) and Benito & Hernando (2008)). However, empirical contributions adressing the
macroeconomic e®ects of interactions between institutions on labour and ¯nancial markets and
focusing on aggregate employment are missing. The goal of this paper is to ¯ll this gap.
We make use of a panel of 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004 in order to study
how labour and ¯nancial market features jointly a®ect the unemployment rate. We estimate a
time-series cross-sectional model including country ¯xed e®ects and interaction terms in order
to investigate the interdependence across several institutional devices on labour and ¯nancial
markets. Our primary goal is to check whether ¯nancial factors matter in determining unem-
ployment. Second, we aim to understand whether the e®ects of ¯nancial arrangements depend
on the labour market context, as the theoretical literature suggests. Finally, we investigate
whether the empirical evidence on employment can be interpreted in the light of the distinction
frequently made between market-based and bank-based ¯nance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical and empirical background
for our research. Data, empirical model and econometric results are presented in Section 3. In
order to ensure that our results are robust to changes in regressors, we consider several ¯nancial
market indicators and alternative labour market characteristics. labour, Section 4 provides
additional robustness checks and discusses the policy consequences of our analysis. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical background
The rationale for our analysis lies at the intersection of two streams of the literature. The
¯rst one deals with the ¯nancial determinants of labour demand. The second one refers to the
interactions between ¯nancial and labour market institutions.
32.1 Financial determinants of labour demand
According to the new-Keynesian view, market imperfections (such as adjustment costs and
information asymmetries) play a crucial role in business °uctuations. This explains why ¯rms'
labour demand depends on ¯nancial factors. Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) and Arnold (2002)
show that ¯nancial constraints induced by information asymmetries make ¯rms' labour demand
dependent on their balance-sheet position. As a consequence, employment °uctuates according
to the ¯nancial pressures that ¯rms face.
Relatively few empirical studies have been devoted to the ¯nancial determinants of labour
demand4. Existing papers are mainly based on ¯rm-level econometric investigations. Sharpe
(1994) ¯nd that the sensitivity of American ¯rms' labour demand to sales increases with their
leverage ratio. Using a set of British ¯rms, Nickell & Wadhwani (1991) show that employment
decreases with ¯rms' leverage ratio and increases with their market capitalization. Nickell &
Nicolitsas (1999) establish that employment falls with the ratio of interest payment to cash-
°ow. Benito & Hernando (2008) obtain the same outcome for Spanish ¯rms. Caggese (2006)
establishes that taking account of both capital and labour demand in the estimation of ¯nancial
constraint is more relevant than estimating the traditional Q model of ¯xed capital.
Other studies examine how ¯nancial factors a®ect employment through their impact on
¯rms' creation. According to Acemoglu (2001), ¯nancial constraint harms employment because
it hinders the emergence of new innovating ¯rms, which create jobs. He observes that, since the
60ies, the employment rates of ¯rms dependent on external ¯nance has been higher in Europe
than in the United States, arguing that this is due to the stronger regulation of European
¯nancial systems. Finally, Belke & Fehn (2002), Fechs & Fuchs (2003) and Belke & al. (2004)
focus on venture capital. Resorting to theoretical formalizations and empirical investigations
using macroeconomic data, they demonstrate that an insu±cient development of venture capital
prevents the emergence of new ¯rms, thus penalizing employment.
2.2 Interactions between ¯nancial and labour markets regulation
An important theoretical debate within the economic literature concerns the sign and e®ects of
interactions between ¯nancial arrangements and labour market institutions.
A ¯rst stream of literature focuses on the common determinants of ¯nancial arrangements
and labour market institutions. On the one hand, Egrungor (2004) suggests that the opposition
between bank-based and market-based ¯nance is linked to a country's legal origins. Whereas
banks act as e®ective contract enforcers in response to the rigidity of civil law-based economies,
¯nancial markets emerge in common law-based countries, where rules are enforced by legal in-
stitutions. On the other hand, Botero et al. (2005) and Pagano & Volpin (2005) argue that
the regulation of labour is generally more stringent in countries with proportional electoral sys-
tems; these systems are also associated with weak shareholders protection and ¯nancial markets
4The ¯nancial determinants of capital demand and the sensitivity of investment to cash-°ow have received
much more attention. On this issue, see the seminal papers by Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988), Gertler &
Gilchrist (1994) and Bond & Meghir (1994).
4development. Taken together, these arguments establish an objective link between ¯nance and
labour market institutions. Countries who have inherited civil law legal systems should asso-
ciate bank dominance with tight labour market regulation while common law countries should
exhibit highly developed ¯nancial markets and °exible labour market regulation. Using a model
where ¯nancial structure and labour market regulation are determined by the distribution of
¯nancial wealth, Perroti & Von Thadden (2006) reach the same conclusion. They show that
economies exhibiting di®used ¯nancial wealth are characterized by highly developed ¯nancial
markets and weak worker protection while economies with concentrated ¯nancial wealth should
feature bank-based ¯nancial systems and strong labour regulation.
Another series of contributions investigates the implications of the interactions between ¯-
nancial arrangements and labour market institutions on unemployment. In a ¯rst set of papers,
¯nancial deregulation and labour market °exibilization are regarded as substitutes. In Rendon
(2000), the removal of ¯ring and hiring costs favours employment. Financial development also
promotes job creation since it allows ¯rms to ¯nance labour adjustment costs by security is-
suance. As their hiring policy becomes less dependent on their internal resources, ¯rms adjust
their employment level more rapidly. Therefore, if ¯nancial development is high, the removal of
labour market adjustment costs loses its e®ectiveness since costs can be ¯nanced by the issuance
of securities. Symmetrically, if the labour market is made perfectly °exible, the access to external
¯nance has less of an impact on employment. In Belke & Fehn (2002), a strong labour protec-
tion allows workers to partly capture the rent stemming from the entrepreneur's project. This
decreases the project's rate of return below the minimum threshold de¯ned by funders. Hence,
the ¯rm can not emerge and no labour is hired, thus generating unemployment. However, the
rise in unemployment yields a decline in labour protection and a subsequent rise in the project's
return above the founders' threshold. Nevertheless, if the ¯rm is ¯nancially constrained, the
adjustment is slower and the return to higher employment is delayed. When the labour market
is °exible, there is no unemployment and ¯nancial deregulation becomes useless. When the
¯nancial system is frictionless, the return to employment is immediate and the deregulation of
labour market loses interest.
In a second set of papers, ¯nancial deregulation and labour market °exibility are seen as
complementary. Wasmer & Weil (2004) provide a model where the liberalization of labour
and/or ¯nancial markets improves markets liquidity and reduces agents' matching costs: ¯rms
and workers match more easily on the labour market, as well as ¯rms and banks on the credit
market. This yields positive e®ects on employment. Koskela & Stenbacka (2002) model the
e®ects of a reduction of bank competition in an economy where workers are remunerated by a
bargained base wage and a share of ¯rms' pro¯t. Because the ¯rms' hiring policy is ¯nanced by
borrowing, an increase in the interest rate implied by a reduction of bank competition hinders
employment. But workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly concerning
their base wage. The moderating e®ectsdominates when unions are powerful. Otherwise, the
former e®ect prevails. Hence, the introduction of imperfections in the banking sector curbs
the negative impact of labour market frictions. In other words, ¯nancial deregulation favours
employment only if the labour market is very °exible. Deregulation becomes counter-productive
if the labour market is highly regulated. Labour and ¯nancial market institutions are also seen as
5complementary in the literature on human capital investment. Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) show
that tight labour market institutions and credit rationing favour ¯rms' investment in human
capital yielding improvements in labour productivity. This result suggests that deregulation
on both labour and ¯nancial markets may trigger productivity losses and adverse e®ects on
employment. Unfortunately, this aspect is not formally addressed in existing theoretical models.
3 Estimations
The theoretical literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that ¯nancial factors matter
in determining unemployment. Moreover, the e®ects of ¯nancial arrangements may depend o
the structure of the labour market. In this respect, the distinction between market-based and
bank-based ¯nance appears crucial.
In this section, we turn to the econometric analysis and outline the details of the empirical
model and the data used in our regressions. Main econometric results are commented and
presented in the tables provided in the Appendix.
3.1 Data and methodology
Our panel includes 18 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom and United States) and covers the period 1980-2004. We consider a time-series cross-
sectional model that includes country ¯xed e®ects as well as a few interaction terms allowing us
to investigate the interdependence across several institutional devices. The general speci¯cation
of our empirical model is as follows:
Ui;t = ®i +¯ ¢Ui;t¡1 +Â¢LABOURi;t +± ¢FINi;t +° ¢LABOURi;t ¢FINi;t +Á¢CVi;t +²i;t (1)
®i is the country i ¯xed e®ect. Ui;t is the standardized rate of unemployment obtained from
the OECD. Ui;t¡1 is the lagged rate of unemployment. This variable captures the inertia in the
unemployment dynamics.
The model features a number of regressors capturing the institutional and macroeconomic
characteristics of the investigated economies. Recent studies have underlined problems related to
the inclusion of time-invariant variables within ¯xed-e®ect models (Amable, Demmou & Gatti
(2007)) . To avoid those problems, we pay particular attention to the institutional variables
included in our regressions. Time-series institutional variables (instead of time-invariant indica-
tors) are preferred whenever they are available.
LABOURi;t is a set of 3 variables accounting for labour market institutions. LMREGi;t is
the measure of employment protection legislation built by Amable, Demmou & Gatti (2007)5.
5This time-series indicator is based on EPL scores provided by Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005) as well as on
measures of structural reforms obtained from the FRDB Database. We use the following variables from FRDB
database: the number of reforms passed each year in each country, whether they are directed towards more
°exibility (by decreasing restrictions in domains such as wage setting, ¯ring restriction, working time regulation
etc.) as well as whether they apply to all, or a large majority of professional categories, contract typologies etc.
6Contrary to the standard OECD indicator, LMREGi;t is a time-series variable between 0 (for
the lowest level of employment protection) to 3 (for the highest level of protection). COORDi;t
evaluates the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. Taken from Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel
(2005), this variable ranges from 0 to 3 with higher scores corresponding to higher coordination.
UNIONi;t is the degree of union density, calculated by the OECD as the proportion of union
members among workers.
FINi;t denotes a set of three ¯nancial indicators. Currently used in the ¯nance and growth
literature, they come from the DemircÄ u» c-Kunt & Levine (2001) data set. CAPIi;t is a ratio of
stock market capitalisation to GDP. CREDITi;t is a ratio of the claims to the private sector by
¯nancial intermediaries (deposit money banks, insurance companies, private pensions, pooled
investment schemes and development banks) to GDP. Both variables capture the e®ect of ¯nan-
cial constraint on unemployment, as described in Rendon (2000), Acemoglu (2001) and Belke
& Fehn (2002)6. However, the two variables can be included in the regressions simultaneously
since, as explained above, intermediated and arm's length ¯nance constitute alternative funding
channels. CONCi;t, which is the ratio of the three largest banks' asset to total banking sector
assets, evaluates the concentration of the banking sector. This measure, suggested by Koskela
& Stenbacka (2002), is only available over the period 1980-2004. Therefore, when CONCi;t is
included in the model, the number of observations is reduced.
CVi;t is a set of six control variables, all provided by the OECD. In reference to the literature
on the institutional determinants of unemployment, we include WEDGEi;t and REPLACEi;t
(the tax wedge and the replacement rate for unemployment bene¯t respectively) as well as
PMREGi;t, an indicator of regulatory reform on product markets. This indicator is based on
the REGREFF indicator from the OECD database and summarizes regulatory provisions in
seven non-manufacturing sectors: telecom, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport,
and road freight. The indicator, which has been estimated by OECD over the period 1975 to
2003, ranges from 0 (for the lowest level of regulation) to 6 (for the highest level of regulation).
The fourth control variable, EXCHANGEi;t, is the real exchange rate. It accounts for the
competitiveness of national products. The ¯fth, GDPi;t, stands for the GDP per employee.
Finally, the last control variable is CY CLEi;t, the ratio of the °ow of credit in the economy to
GDP, which accounts for the impact of the credit cycle7. It is introduced in the estimation only
when CREDITi;t is not already included.
The list of dependent and independent variables described above is given by Table 1 in the
Appendix. Table 2, also presented in the Appendix, provides summary statistics for each of
them.
It is worth noting that our empirical model includes several interaction terms allowing us to
capture the interdependence between ¯nancial and labour market devices. We examine whether
the consequences of ¯nancial market arrangements depend on the regulatory environment on
6Following the empirical studies by Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke & al. (2004) and Fechs & Fuchs (2003), we
also could have considered the level of venture capital ¯nancing. But many venture capital data are missing for
the period and the countries covered by our panel.
7CREDITi;t is a stock variable that accounts for the structural aspects of the ¯nancial system whereas
CY CLEi;t is a °ow variable that captures conjonctural e®ects.
7the labour market, and vice versa. A speci¯c STATA procedure evaluates the e®ects of each
relevant variable for di®erent levels of the interacted variables. This amounts to calculating the
marginal e®ects of each variable, as well as all statistics concerning the signi¯cance of those
marginal e®ects. In the presence of interaction terms, the overall impact of LABOUR and
FIN indicators on unemployment equals the marginal e®ect conditional on speci¯c values of the
interacted variables. From model (1), one has:
@U
@LABOUR
= Â + ° ¢ ] FIN (2)
@U
@FIN
= ± + ° ¢ ^ LABOUR
where ] FIN and ^ LABOUR correspond to speci¯c levels of labour and ¯nancial indicators that
have been selected to give a clear picture of the importance and evolution of marginal coe±cients.
The speci¯c levels that we have retained are minimum value, mean value minus one standard
error, mean, mean plus one standard error and maximum value.
3.2 Results
As we have seen, the theoretical literature on unemployment determinants generally focuses
on the degree of rigidity of labour market institutions in relation to ¯nancial characteristics.
Hence, in the ¯rst place we restrict our attention to labour market variables capturing the
rigidity of labour regulation, that is UNION and LMREG8. To ensure that our results are
robust, we consider several variants of our empirical model. We proceed as follows: leaving
the speci¯cation with the two labour regulation variables (UNION and LMREG) and the six
control variables unchanged, we consider our ¯nancial variables one by one. We subsequently
estimate an encompassing model including all labour and ¯nancial indicators. Doing this, we pay
particular attention to the interaction terms included in our regressions. Considering interactions
with one labour market variable at a time allows us to check for the robustness of the estimated
coe±cients across alternative speci¯cations. We are thus able to make sure that the signs of
those coe±cients are not too sensitive to changes in the interacted variables.
Before turning to regressions, we check the stationarity of our time-series by running unit root
tests. We ¯nd thatthe variables included in our regressions are stationary with a drift (see Table 3
in the Appendix). Moreover, resorting to the tests proposed by Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005)
as well as to the STATA Wooldridge test (xserial), we check for the presence of heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation in the regression residuals. We cannot reject the hypothesis that our residuals
are heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Hence, we make use of robust estimators and assume the
presence of panel-speci¯c rhos to cope with residual autocorrelation in the error terms (STATA
option \psar1").
To obtain our results, we proceed in two steps. We ¯rst estimate our model, using the GLS
method and correcting for panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals. Then,
8However, in the next section we will add one additional labour market dimension by taking the impact of
wage coordination into account.
8we determine the marginal e®ects of ¯nancial (respectively labour market) variables according to
given selected levels of the LABOUR indicators (respectively the FIN indicators): minimum,
mean minus one standard error, mean, mean plus one standard error and maximum.
The econometric results are fully reported in Table 4 whereas Table 5 shows the marginal
coe±cients of LABOUR and FIN indicators for given levels of the interacted variables. Both
tables are presented in the Appendix.
In Table 4 (columns [1]-[2]) we present results for a speci¯cation including CAPI (ratio of
stock market development to GDP) as a unique ¯nancial indicator. In columns [3]-[4] we consider
CREDIT (ratio of the claims to the private sector by ¯nancial intermediaries to GDP), while
in columns [5]-[6] we investigate the e®ects of CONC (concentration of the banking sector).
For each of the above speci¯cation, we interact our selected ¯nancial indicator with one labour
market variable at a time (LMREG or UNION). Finally, columns [7]-[8] presentthe regression
results based on the encompassing model featuring all ¯nancial indicators together. Once again,
we interact those indicators with LMREG (column [7]) or UNION (column [8]) alternatively.
We comment on our results on labour market and control variables below. We then analyse the
econometric evidence concerning the ¯nancial factors.
Table 5 reports marginal coe±cients estimated by STATA on the basis of regression results
presented in Table 4. Column [1] in Part A of Table 5 provides marginal coe±cients for the CAPI
indicator corresponding to ¯ve di®erent levels of the interacted labour variable as speci¯ed in
column [1] of Table 4 (i.e. LMREG). Symmetrically, column [1] in Part B of Table 5 reports the
marginal coe±cients of the LMREG variable for given levels of the interacted ¯nancial indicator
(i.e. CAPI). We apply the same procedure to all other columns of Table 5. However, one should
note that no marginal coe±cient can be calculated for labour market variables (speci¯cations [7]-
[8] in Part A of Table 5). The reason is that those variants of the model include three interactions
terms for each labour indicator. Hence, we cannot isolate pertinent reference values of interacted
variables enabling us to calculate marginal coe±cients properly. Nevertheless, we can calculate
the marginal coe±cients for the ¯nancial variables. These coe±cients are presented in columns
[7]-[8], Part B of Table 5. We comment on these results below.
To start with, one should note that the coe±cient of the lagged rate of unemployment is
highly signi¯cant and positive in all regressions, highlighting a strong inertia in the evolution of
employment performances. Concerning the e®ects of control variables, our results are generally
standard and in line with the existing literature. The signs of coe±cients for EXCHANGE,
GDP and CY CLE are negative, although the real exchange rate appears insigni¯cant in vari-
ants [5]-[6]. Hence, as expected, we ¯nd that increased competitiveness, productivity and the
°ow of credit generally imply lower unemployment. Moreover, as expected, we ¯nd that an
increase in the tax wedge raises unemployment. The same result holds for stronger product
market regulation, although the coe±cient of PMREG appears much less robust across alterna-
tive speci¯cations. Finally, as in other empirical contributions (Nickell (1997), Fiori, Nicoletti,
Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable & al. (2007)), the coe±cient
on the replacement rate is generally insigni¯cant.
Turning to the impact of labour market variables, our results indicate that changing labour
markets' structure has contrasted e®ects on unemployment. On the one hand, in line with the
9existing literature, we ¯nd that union density has a positive coe±cient: increased union bargain-
ing power contributes, as expected, to raise unemployment. On the other hand, we ¯nd that the
coe±cient of labour market regulation is negative, which means that increased job protection
contributes to lower unemployment. In a previous empirical study, Amable & al. (2007) also
obtain a negative sign for labour market regulation, when considering the determinants of inac-
tivity and joblessness rates9. This result is in line with theoretical conclusions from e±ciency
wage models, which show that ¯ring costs help to reduce excess ¯ring and thus limit real wage
pressure and improve aggregated employment (Amable & Gatti (2004) and Amable & Gatti
(2006)). One should note that the sign and signi¯cance of the e®ects of market regulation and
union density do not depend on the level of the interacted ¯nancial variable, with the excep-
tion of speci¯cation [1] where the coe±cient on LMREG, given in Part B of Table 5, becomes
insigni¯cant for values of CAPI above the mean level.
Let us now focus on results concerning ¯nancial indicators. Our ¯ndings globally support the
idea that unemployment has ¯nancial determinants and that these determinants interact with
labour market institutions.
Regressions [1]-[2] and [7]-[8] in Table 4 investigate the consequences of increased market
capitalization (variable CAPI). This variable generally appears to promote employment: the
coe±cients of CAPI is negative and signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. This result is consistent
with conclusions from the theoretical literature, suggesting that ¯nancial market development
have a positive bearing on employment in terms of released ¯nancial constraints. It also con¯rms
Nickell & Wadhwani (1991)'s result that increased market capitalization has a positive impact
on ¯rms' labour demand. The result is partially con¯rmed by the analysis of the marginal e®ects
of CAPI, provided in part A of Table 5. .The sign on marginal e®ects is generally negative,
but not always signi¯cant for all speci¯cations. In particular, in variants [1]-[2], we ¯nd that
increased CAPI reduces unemployment only if labour market regulation and union density are
low (i.e. not higher than the mean level). It has no signi¯cant e®ects otherwise.
If the CAPI variable measures the size and importance of ¯nancial markets, the alternative
CREDIT indicator allows us to investigate the e®ects of intermediated credit. The results pro-
vided in Table 4 show that this variable turns out to be signi¯cant both alone and interacted with
labour market indicators (expect in speci¯cation [3]). We can interpret the regression results by
looking at the sign and signi¯cance of marginal coe±cients presented in Table 5. Our main results
are twofold. On the one hand, we ¯nd that increased intermediated credit reduces unemploy-
ment if the labour market is highly regulated, whereas it increases the unemployment rate if the
labour market is weakly regulated (regression [7], Part A of Table 5). However, the coe±cients
are insigni¯cant in the alternative speci¯cation [3]. The result can be interpreted according
to the theoretical literature on the interactions between labour and ¯nancial markets factors:
when workers are well-protected by legislation, ¯rms are pushed to increase their productivity
and monitoring by ¯nancial intermediaries becomes pro¯table, thus making intermediated credit
favourable to employment; conversely, a low degree of labour regulation is associated with lesser
9The following papers ¯nd an insigni¯cant coe±cient for labour market regulation: Nickell (1997), Layard &
Nickell (1999), Belot & Ours (2001), Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli
(2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable & al. (2007).
10¯nancial intermediaries' monitoring e®ort, implying that credit ¯nancing harms employment.
On the other hand, our regressions provide robust evidence that an increase in intermediated
credit reduces unemployment when associated with a low level of union density (i.e. not higher
than the mean level), as shown in speci¯cations [4] and [8]. Symmetrically, columns [4] and [8]
also indicate that increased CREDIT raises unemployment for high levels of union density (i.e.
the maximum level). These results suggest that strong unions may pro¯t from increased credit
supply. They may be better able to renegotiate higher wages, thus yielding a negative e®ect on
employment. Unions' low bargaining power allows to moderate this e®ect.
Finally, we turn to the consequences of increased banking concentration (variable CONC).
As already noted, this variable as been available for a shorter period of time, so the number of
observations is more limited. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that in all
variants of our model, concentration in the banking sector has a negative direct e®ect on em-
ployment, in all variants of our model. However, once again, the interaction terms are generally
signi¯cant. Our results are better understood by looking at the marginal e®ects presented in
Table 5. Results provided in this table show that increased CONC harms employment if the
labour market is weakly regulated, i.e. if LMREG is not higher than the mean level (speci¯ca-
tions [5] and [7]), or when union density is low, i.e. if UNION is not higher than mean level
(columns [6] and [8]). In all other cases, CONC has no signi¯cant impact. As suggested by the
theoretical literature, the rationale of these results is that two opposite mechanisms are at play.
On the one hand, credit rationing associated with low bank competition hinders employment.
On the other hand, organized workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly
concerning their base wage. This moderating e®ect is stronger when unions are powerful and
workers are more protected.
Taken together, these results suggest that intermediated credit plays an alternative role with
respect to arm's length ¯nance. When labour market regulation is low, an increase in arm's
length ¯nance (i.e. increased market capitalization and reduced banking concentration) yields
positive e®ects on employment while increased intermediated credit pushes employment down.
However, when labour market regulation is high, the positive impact of arm's length ¯nance is less
robust while increased bank-based ¯nance favours employment. This provides the ¯rst evidence
showing a trade-o® between bank-based and arm's length ¯nance in promoting employment, and
that this trade-o® is mediated by the labour market structure.
Hence, our results indicate that the e®ects of ¯nancial variables on unemployment are depen-
dent on the labour markets context. However, it is important to note that these interdependence
are not symmetric. The impact of labour market institutions appears largely independent of the
features of ¯nancial markets: whatever the level of ¯nancial indicators, reducing employment
protection always raises unemployment, while reducing union density always reduces it.
4 Extentions
In this section, we presents two extentions to our empirical analysis. First, we check for the ro-
bustness of empirical results by running regressions including wage coordination as an alternative
11labour market device. Second, we analyse the policy implications of our empirical evidence.
4.1 Robustness check: wage coordination
Many empirical contributions have shown that the degree of coordination in wage bargaining
is an important determinant of unemployment. Moreover, wage coordination is admittedly
one crucial factor shaping the distinction between corporatist and non-corporatist countries
(Calmsfors & Dri±ll (1988)). This section aims to check whether coordination still matters, when
considered in interaction with ¯nancial variables. Hence, we introduce the variable COORD in
all our regression speci¯cations. Results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix. Table
6 reports regressions coe±cients for four variants of the empirical model: in columns [1] to [3]
we interact the labour market variable COORD with each ¯nancial factor in turn. Column
[4] presents the results from the comprehensive model including all ¯nancial indicators and
interaction terms. In Table 7, we provide marginal coe±cients' values and statistics relative
to the four speci¯cations of the empirical model. As in the previous section, we are unable to
compute sensible marginal coe±cients for COORD in variant [4], since the size of the marginal
e®ect depends on the interactions of three di®erent variables.
From Table 6 one can see that the regression results are conssitent with those presented in the
previous section, concerning the control and labour market variables, in particular. Concerning
the wage coordination variable COORD, we are unable to ¯nd robust and signi¯cant e®ects on
employment: marginal coe±cients provided in Part B of Table 7 are, at best, weakly signi¯cant
for low levels of interacted ¯nancial variables. This suggests that coordination does not contribute
to wage moderation, contrary to the current view (Calmsfors & Dri±ll (1988)). The result is in
the line with evidence provided by Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007) and Baccaro
& Rei (2007). As explained by the authors, weak coordination yields low bargaining power for
workers, which may allow ¯rms to avoid an excessive rise in wages. Our evidence indicates that
this e®ect prevails in contexts where ¯nancial markets are highly deregulated (with weak levels
of banking concentration and intermediated credit).
Turning to ¯nancial variables, our regression results show that the degree of wage coordi-
nation is not neutral with respect to the way ¯nancial determinants a®ect unemployment. In
particular, the marginal coe±cients presented in Part A of Table 7 suggest that, for degrees of
coordination below the mean level, stronger market capitalization favours a decrease in unem-
ployment (speci¯cation [1]) while an increase in intermediated credit and banking concentration
push unemployment upward (speci¯cations [2] and [3]). All ¯nancial indicators have no signi¯-
cant e®ect otherwise. Moreover, the regression results from the comprehensive model featuring
all ¯nancial indicators (speci¯cation [4]) indicate that an increase in intermediated credit con-
tributes to reduced unemployment for degrees of coordination above the mean level. Compared
with ¯ndings reported in Tables 4 and 5, these results indicate that the wage coordination vari-
able behaves as the labour regulation indicator. This is consistent with the view that wage
bargaining coordination works as a form of labour protection rather than as a device ensuring
real wage moderation.
More generally, the evidence presented in Tables 6 and 7 con¯rms our previous ¯ndings:
12boosting ¯nancial markets development while reducing banking concentration and intermediated
credit appear to e®ectively reduce unemployment, as long as the labour market has a weakly
coordinated structure. However, with highly coordinated labour markets, fostering bank-based
¯nance becomes a more appropriate tool for reducing unemployment. This con¯rms the existence
of a trade-o® between bank-based and market-based ¯nance in promoting employment, which is
mediated by the labour market structure.
4.2 Policy consequences
Our empirical evidence indicates that the e®ects of ¯nancial variables on unemployment are
signi¯cant and depend on the labour markets structure. Regression results suggest that the
respective virtues of bank-based and market-based ¯nance are crucially tied to the nature and
strength of labour regulation. Arm's length ¯nance (through increased capitalization, as well
as through lesser banking concentration and ¯nancial intermediation) is advantageous in terms
of employment in the presence of low levels of labour market regulation and wage coordination.
Conversely, higher intermediated credit appears to be bene¯cial for employment in the presence
of high levels of labour market regulation and coordination. Importantly, ¯nancial market devel-
opment and bank-based ¯nancing exhibit a common feature: both are more e®ective in curbing
unemployment when they are combined with a low level of union density. These results provide
evidence supporting the idea that a correlation exists betweeen tight institutional devices on
labour and ¯nancial markets (Rajan & Zingales (1995), Egrungor (2004), Botero et al. (2005)).
In this section, we tackle the issue of the importance and size of the 'real' e®ects of ¯nance.
Based on our regression results, we present a few examples evaluating the employment conse-
quences associated with given changes in ¯nancial indicators.
Let us ¯rst consider the marginal coe±cients presented in Table 5. Regression results ob-
tained on the basis of our comprehensive model speci¯cation yield marginal coe±cients listed in
columns [7] and [8]. Those coe±cients indicate that the ¯nancial variables have sizeable e®ects
on unemployment. Increasing market capitalization by one standard deviation (0.4) yields a de-
crease in the unemployment rate comprised between 0.8 - 1%, depending on the level of labour
regulation (column [7]). The tighter is labour regulation, thr stronger the e®ect. This becomes
even more important when one considers high degrees of unionization (column [8]). Hence,
lower capitalization of ¯nancial markets can lead to substantial employment losses. Concerning
bank-based ¯nance, we obtaind signi¯cant e®ects regarding levels of labour regulation that are
above the mean: increasing credit intermediation by one standard deviation (0.37) reduces un-
employment by 0.5 up to 1% when considering high levels of regulation or union density. As a
consequence, a decrease in intermediated credit can yield an important decline in employment
in countries with tight labour regulation. The reverse e®ect is found for banking concentration:
increasing concentration by one standard deviation (0.2) pushes employment up by 0.3 - 0.5%
according to the level of labour regulation and union density. In this case, stronger regulation
makes the e®ects of banking concentration weaker. Hence, countries with relatively weak regu-
lation are put under greater pressure following an increase in banking concentration. The same
type of results can be obtained concerning the marginal coe±cients presented in Table 7.
13These results suggest that ¯nancial turmoils may have signi¯cant real e®ects on employment.
More speci¯cally, a decrease in market capitalization has widespread e®ects for all levels of
labour regulation, while reduced intermediated credit (resp. banking concentration) only a®ects
highly (resp. weakly) regulated economies. As a consequence, providing conditions for an
increasing market capitalization (with respect to GDP) is one general policy recommandation.
However, we ¯nd that highly regulated countries are well-advised to implement policies that
aim to promote credit intermediation while weakly regulated countries should focus on limiting
banking concentration.
We also investigate how changes in ¯nancial variables impact unemployment in each country
of our dataset. We compute simulations on the basis of the encompassing model, presented in
Table 4 (columns [7] and [8]) and Table 6 (column [4]). We select one of the three ¯nancial
variables (CAPI, CREDIT or CONC) and, for each year, we set it equal to its 'high level',
de¯ned as its observed level plus one standard deviation. The labour variable and the two other
¯nancial variables are kept equal to their observed value. Using our econometric estimates of the
encompassing model, we compute the rate of unemployment compatible with the 'high level' of
the selected ¯nancial variable. We then compare the value of the estimated unemployment rate
with the observed unemployment rate.
Figures 1 and 2, in the Appendix, are two clear-cut examples of simulations. In Figure
1, the selected ¯nancial variable (set equal to its 'high level') is CAPI and the interaction
labour variable is COORD while in Figure 2, the selected ¯nancial variable is CREDIT and
the interaction labour variable is LMREG. In Figure 1, the estimated unemployment rate is
lower than the observed unemployment rate for nearly all countries. This suggests that in almost
all countries, employment performance would have been improved with a higher level of market
capitalisation. This is consistent with the result mentioned above: the positive e®ects of ¯nancial
markets do not depend on labour institutions. The conclusion is very di®erent in Figure 2. In
Autralia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, a high level of intermediated
credit raises the unemployment rate compared to its observed level while reducing it in Austria,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain. This supports the view
that boosting credit intermediation is a relevant policy when the labour market is strongly
regulated whereas it worsens employment when the labour market is weakly regulated.
5 Conclusion
The paper aims to examine how ¯nancial market arrangements interact with labour regulation to
determine unemployment. Our econometric estimates show that the development of arms' length
¯nance (through increased capitalization, as well as lower banking concentration and ¯nancial
intermediation) favours employment in the presence of low levels of labour market regulation and
wage bargaining coordination. At the same time, improving intermediated credit is bene¯cial
for employment in the presence of high levels of labour market regulation and coordination.
Importantly, the development of both ¯nancial market and intermediated ¯nancing is more
e®ective when combined with low levels of union density.
14Our ¯ndings suggest that ¯nancial variables impact unemployment in a way that crucially de-
pends on the labour market context. In the presence of weakly regulated and coordinated labour
markets, policies boosting market-based ¯nance prove to be e®ective in enhancing employment.
However, with strongly regulated and coordinated labour markets, sustaining and promoting in-
termediated credit has positive consequences on employment. These estimated e®ects of ¯nance
appear to be signi¯cant and sizeable.
Our paper also advocates care in analyzing the e®ectiveness of changes on ¯nancial and labour
markets. The e®ects of deregulation policies are not linear. For instance, while reducing labour
protection directly increases unemployment, it also leads to a new context in which increasing
market-based ¯nance favours employment.
To conclude, we ¯nd no evidence corroborating the existence of a simple complementarity (or
substitution) across ¯nancial and labour market structures. in fact, our results suggest that a
more complex interdependence exists across ¯nancial and labour determinants of unemployment.
This calls for further investigations and opens up a rich research agenda.
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19Variables Mean Max Min
U 7.447 19.5 1.5
(3.504)
LMREG 1.140 0.558 0.1
(0.558)
COORD 2.051 3 1
(0.578)
UNION 41.996 87.4 7.4
(21.068)
CAPI 0.492 2.7 0.003
(0.404)
CREDIT 0.878 2.168 0.220
(0.378)
CONC 0.678 1 0.226
(0.203)
WEDGE 28.693 46.962 12.944
(8.081)
REPLACE 0.356 28 0
(1.312)
PMREG 4.033 6 1.108
(1.285)
EXCHANGE 0.002 0.266 -0.203
(0.058)
GDP 53 912.02 80 659.9 26 558.71
(9 983.803)
















Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
20Variables Lags Drift F-Stat Conclusion
U 2 yes 110.8758*** I(0)
UNION 2 yes 83.6080*** I(0)
CAPI 2 yes 50.0357* I(0)
CREDIT 2 yes 63.5895*** I(0)
CONC 2 yes 114.0264*** I(0)
WEDGE 2 yes 112.8392*** I(0)
EXCHANGE 2 yes 183.9557*** I(0)
GDP 2 yes 48.1921* I(0)
CY CLE 2 yes 98.50*** I(0)
Table 3: Unit root tests
21Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ui;t¡1 0.723*** 0.713*** 0.651*** 0.674*** 0.544*** 0.572*** 0.575*** 0.589***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049)
LMREG -0.945* -0.184 -1.888 -1.896*** -3.288*** -3.435*** -0.628 -3.229***
(0.502) (0.626) (1.195) (0.922) (1.271) (1.218) (1.164) (1.246)
UNION 0.027* 0.028** 0.056** 0.035 0.203*** 0.235*** 0.194*** 0.214***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.024) (0.052) (0.054) (0.043) (0.048)
CAPI -0.778* -1.222*** -1.983*** -1.377***
(0.426) (0.435) (0.588) (0.471)
CREDIT 0.961 -1.560** 1.591* -2.406***
(0.872) (0.662) (0.876) (0.666)
CONC 2.285* 2.635*** 2.914*** 2.716***













WEDGE 0.030 0.036* 0.056** 0.052** 0.138*** 0.124** 0.090** 0.067*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.053) (0.053) (0.038) (0.039)
REPLACE 1.314 1.651 -1.395 -0.278 2.978 2.758 2.105 1.825
(1.147) (1.138) (1.680) (1.671) (2.105) (2.029) (20.029) (1.973)
PMREG 0.176 0.184 0.033 0.083 0.317 0.278 0.470** 0.454**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.167) (0.155) (0.254) (0.255) (0.183) (0.206)
EXCHANGE -1.417*** -1.534*** -1.325*** -1.577*** -0.552 -0.724 -2.623*** -1.940***
(0.541) (0.539) (0.499) (0.493) (0.654) (0.632) (0.589) (0.585)
GDP -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.061***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of observations 314 314 330 355 162 162 188 188
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country trend no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***: signi¯cant at 1%, **: signi¯cant at 5%, *: signi¯cant at 10%.
Table 4: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms
22Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Part A Marginal e®ects of CAPI
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin -0.762* -1.081*** -1.994*** -1.574***
(0.402) (0.386) (0.553) (0.382)
LABOURmean¡se -0.680** -0.843** -2.042*** -1.730***
(0.320) (0.330) (0.422) (0.339)
LABOURmean -0.588* -0.430 -2.101*** -2.123***
(0.339) (0.348) (0.355) (0.384)
LABOURmean+se -0.495 -0.018 -2.161*** -2.516***
(0.460) (0.496) (0.434) (0.583)
LABOURmax -0.445 0.451 -2.193*** -3.115***
(0.546) (0.702) (0.520) (0.969)
Marginal e®ects of CREDIT
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 0.899 -1.283** 1.367* -1.988***
(0.809) (0.581) (0.802) (0.560)
LABOURmean¡se 0.613 -0.802* 0.368 -1.657***
(0.539) (0.453) (0.501) (0.485)
LABOURmean 0.263 0.001 -0.857** -0.824**
(0.347) (0.320) (0.355) (0.364)
LABOURmean+se -0.087 0.803** -2.082*** 0.009
(0.503) (0.384) (0.626) (0.405)
LABOURmax -0.299 1.711*** -2.745*** 1.279*
(0.693) (0.614) (0.836) (0.686)
Marginal e®ects of CONC
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 2.182*** 2.202*** 2.789*** 2.505***
(0.390) (0.424) (0.425) (0.374)
LABOURmean¡se 1.719*** 1.840*** 2.231*** 2.336***
(0.351) (0.359) (0.347) (0.333)
LABOURmean 1.150** 1.001* 1.546*** 1.914***
(0.537) (0.543) (0.454) (0.561)
LABOURmean+se 0.582 0.162 0.862 1.492
(0.822) (0.925) (0.683) (0.955)
LABOURmax 0.289 -1.146 0.491 0.849
(0.981) (1.587) (0.825) (1.608)
Part B Marginal e®ects of LMREG
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin -0.944* -2.029* -3.521***
(0.501) (1.110) (1.242)
FINmean¡se -0.931* -2.180** -3.796***
(0.496) (1.040) (1.226)
FINmean -0.875* -2.409** -4.000***
(0.492) (0.978) (1.229)
FINmean+se - 0.819 2.639* -4.205***
(0.519) (0.981) (1.242)
FINmax -0.629 -3.193*** -4.319***
(0.768) (1.231) (1.255)
Marginal e®ects of UNION
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin 0.027** 0.043* 0.225***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.052)
FINmean¡se 0.029** 0.053** 0.213***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.051)
FINmean 0.035** 0.067*** 0.204***
(0.014 ) (0.022) (0.051)
FINmean+se 0.042*** 0.081*** 0.195***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.051)
FINmax 0.064*** 0.114*** 0.190
(0.024) (0.029) (0.052)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***: signi¯cant at 1%, **: signi¯cant at 5%, *: signi¯cant at 10%.
Table 5: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms: marginal e®ects
of ¯nancial and labour market variables
23Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ui;t¡1 0.726*** 0.643*** 0.531*** 0.563***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.053) (0.047)
LMREG -0.833* -2.515*** -3.955*** -2.203**
(0.500) (0.961) (1.212) (1.088)
COORD -0.082 1.071** 1.178* 3.805***
(0.217) (0.439) (0.629) (0.768)
UNION 0.026* 0.046* 0.208*** 0.228***













WEDGE 0.029 0.065** 0.148*** 0.154***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.054) (0.043)
REPLACE 1.371 -0.663 3.270 2.627
(1.173) (1.696) (2.039) (1.880)
PMREG 0.188 0.071 0.365 0.483**
(0.146) (0.163) (0.262) (0.224)
EXCHANGE -1.369** -1.368*** -0.712 -2.306***
(0.541) (0.499) (0.634) (0.553)
GDP -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.052*** -0.057***
(0.007) (0.011)
Number of observations 314 330 162 162
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Country trend no yes yes yes
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***: signi¯cant at 1%, **: signi¯cant at 5%, *: signi¯cant at 10%.
Table 6: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms
24Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Part A Marginal e®ects of CAPI
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Marginal e®ects of CREDIT
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Marginal e®ects of CONC
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Part B Marginal e®ects of COORD
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
CAPI CREDIT CONC
FINmin -.081 .886* 0.842**
(0.216) (0.505) (0.362)
FINmean¡se -0.064 0.544 0.599**
(0.210) (0.384) (0.399)
FINmean 0.007 0.289 .230
(0.214) (0.329) (0.270)
FINmean+se .079 .035 -0.139
(0.257) (0.321) (0.336)
FINmax .323 -.106 -1.031
(0.528) (0.339) (0.633)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***: signi¯cant at 1%, **: signi¯cant at 5%, *: signi¯cant at 10%.
Table 7: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms: marginal e®ects of ¯nancial and
labour market variables
25Figure 1.
26Figure 2.
27